Dr. Eileen Keller, Senior Researcher at the Franco-German Institute

Compared to the project of a European Defence Community (EDC), European defence integration has remained far behind the ambitions expressed in the Treaty back in the early 1950s. Making practical progress has been far from easy and it is difficult to realize significant steps forward based on the current EU-framework. Yet, complementing existing institutional dispositions by drawing on a more restrictive format and an alternative legal framework as offered by the EDC Treaty is an option to move forward. This can be justified on both practical and normative grounds. 

From a practical perspective, European integration has by no means been a homogenous process. Rather, its reality is that of a multi-layered entity of overlapping circles consisting of differing shared competences. This is true both in its internal dimension among member states – for example through opt-outs as with the Euro – and externally, including non-EU members in EU-dispositions as is the case with third country participation in the Schengen space, research cooperation, the Customs Union, or the Internal Market. The Treaties themselves foresee the option of internal differentiation in the form of enhanced cooperation (Art. 20 TEU) or permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) in the area of defence (Art. 42 TEU), established in 2017 – provided that the aim is deepening integration.

From a normative perspective, European integration has become less self-evident in the past two decades and the European project of an ever-closer Union has met with the increasing resistance of mainly (but not only) populist parties with a strong emphasis on nationalism. This development has been causally linked to the changing nature of European integration moving even further into domains of state sovereignty and core state powers as was the case with monetary integration. Clearly, this also concerns the realm of defence and it is highly unlikely that the political willingness to deepen European defence integration will be given univocally in all member states and at the same time, not least because four of them are neutral, non-aligned countries.

As a consequence of increased politicization, fundamental reform that requires treaty change has become a cumbersome and uncertain enterprise to say the least. Unanimity among member states in the Council and the often demanding ratification procedures within each member state give disproportionate power to any member that is not interested in furthering integration, blocking progress for all other parties. 

In this context, differentiated integration has proven to be a constructive way forward to avoid deadlock and disproportionate blocking power. Internal differentiation has also been realized by the means of supplemental treaties, which are closely articulated with EU law. This is, for instance, the case with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a highly important safeguard for the Eurozone whose establishment would have been more difficult by drawing exclusively on existing European law (and hence requiring fully-fletched treaty change).

Constructive restriction of formats is also a European reality at the stage of agenda setting and the formulation of policy proposals. This is particularly true for the merits of the Franco-German engine whose bilateral compromises by proxy have made a difference at crucial moments in the development of the European project. For example, the NextGenerationEU Recovery Fund was facilitated by the agreement of France and Germany and the specific cooperation and coordination mechanisms that exist between the two countries. One may expect a similar effect regarding the ease of negotiations on a future defence union in a reduced format of fewer countries.

Restrictive formats can have benefits even for those not directly involved as long as there is an openness in terms of joining or being included if vital interests are not sufficiently addressed. Differentiation does not automatically lead to fragmentation in the form of a “Europe à la carte” even though the risk exists. 

In sum, thinking of a defence-avant-garde based on the EDC- is a promising starting point for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it makes use of an existing treaty involving the six countries that have been at the origins of the European project, making up for about two thirds of total defence expenditure in the EU. On the other hand, the Treaty explicitly allows for the integration of new members. Given the particular sensitivity to the threat of a Russian aggressor in Northern and Eastern Europe, and hence a pronounced interest in strengthening European defence capacities, a more restrictive defence union may also provide for a constructive format for dialogue along the East-West-divide, complementing the North-South-divide that France and Germany have used to incorporate.

One caveat though: A more closely integrated European defence Union is likely to create positive externalities in terms of collective security and threat potential in light of an external aggressor. In other words, the benefits of a closer defence union will not be limited to those participating in it. Hence, one will have to be careful on institutional design in order not to de-incentivize further member states to join the defence union. 

The fact that the United States (and NATO) have played an important role in the postwar European security architecture may have contributed to the fact that EU-defence integration has remained more limited than in other areas of core state power. Given the changing role of the United States on the international scene, there is good reason to think about new forms of European defence integration now.