Davide Genini (PhD Candidate, DCU)
The European Union (EU) has a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP framework, as laid out in the Lisbon Treaty, defines the EU’s operational capacity to conduct civilian and military missions beyond its borders with the overarching aim of strengthening international security and supporting the principles of the United Nations Charter. Although CSDP technically falls under EU competences (Art. 2(4) TFEU), it remains firmly a high-politics domain that Member States are reluctant to transfer to the EU on the same footing as, inter alia, monetary policy and the customs union. As a result, CSDP is governed by “special rules and procedures”, distinguishing it from other EU policies (Art. 24(1) TEU). The increasingly dangerous geopolitical landscape has underscored the urgency for establishing a true European Defence Union (EDU). However, the EU lacks the necessary strength and instruments to transform into an EDU, due to three principal legal obstacles.
Firstly, the intergovernmental governance system. Any action in the CSDP areas requires unanimous agreement among the Member States’s defence ministers in the Council, hindering quick-response readiness to security shocks. Crucially, any shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting within the CSDP is categorically precluded (Articles 31(3) and 48(7) TEU). The European Commission holds no authority in the defence realm, while the High Representative lacks the mandate and powers of a true Defence Minister, leaving the EDU without a decisive, supranational manager. The EU possesses no independent military assets, relying instead on the ad hoc availability of resources from individual Member States (Art. 42(1) TEU). It lacks a permanent, fully operational Command and Control (C2) structure for large-scale military operations beyond its borders, as the existing Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was not designed to manage major executive missions.
Establishing a European common army now requires unanimous approval from all twenty-seven Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government within the European Council (Art. 42(2) TEU). This process demands an arduous alignment of diverse political preferences and strategic priorities – including those of neutral states – under a shared recognition that Europe’s defence is fundamentally a European, rather than a national or transatlantic, responsibility under the mutual defence clause ex Art. 42(7) TEU. Even if this consensus were reached, a further procedural hurdle remains: ratification by each Member State according to its constitutional requirements. This typically involves parliamentary approval and, in some cases, public referenda, adding yet another layer of complexity to the formation of a unified European common defence.
Secondly, the lack of democratic legitimacy. The European Parliament (EP) is the EU’s only directly elected institution and embodies the Union’s democratic core. While the EP’s powers have expanded over successive stages of European integration, the EP still plays no substantive role under the “special rules and procedures” label governing the CSDP framework (Art. 24(1) TEU). It has neither legislative authority to initiate or approve CSDP decisions nor effective oversight powers, apart from limited consultations with the High Representative, occasional recommendations to the Council (Art. 36 TEU), and non-binding resolutions. Furthermore, the EP has minimal influence over CSDP spending within the Multi-Annual Financial Framework, as most CSDP expenditures are handled through off-budget mechanisms.
Thirdly, financial unpreparedness. Article 41(2) TEU prohibits the use of the EU’s general budget for military purposes, necessitating alternative instruments. Currently, military actions are funded through the European Peace Facility, an off-budget fund where Member States retain full discretion over the timing, amount, and focus of their investments. Meanwhile, the EU’s general budget – restricted to civilian missions – allocates only €2.5 billion to the CSDP for the 2021–2027 period, one of the smallest allocations in the Union. Compounding this, EU Member States are emerging from three decades of underinvestment in defence. Most have consistently fallen short of the 2% GDP defence spending target, a situation only partially rectified following Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Aggregate EU defence spending is about one-third of that of the US, and the European defence industry itself is fragmented, lacks interoperability, and suffers from duplication, with European manufacturers producing over twenty tank models compared to the single model used in the US. While issuing common EU debt would be a decisive instrument to align EU finances with emerging security priorities and enable competition with the US on an even footing, this would legally require a unanimous decision by the member states, which remains politically unfeasible due to strong opposition from “frugal” Member States.
In conclusion, the EU remains legally ill-equipped to establish a genuine European Defence Union. Although European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has appointed the first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space and tasked the new High Representative with building a true EDU, the EU lacks the fundamentals – centralised governance, democratic legitimisation, and sufficient financial resources – necessary even to consider a common defence.
